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I

n May 2002, American Green Berets began training the first group of Afghan
soldiers for the new Afghan National Army (ANA). This complex mission
will take years to accomplish, yet it is expected to contribute greatly to the return
of peace and normalcy to Afghanistan. The United States, the main sponsor of the
effort, sees the project as an effective alternative to the expansion of international
security forces to police the war-devastated country. Further, the United States
expects that the ANA will aid in the multilateral struggle against terrorist activity
in the region.
This is the fourth time in 150 years of Afghanistan’s turbulent history
that the country is recreating the state military following its total disintegration
caused by foreign invasions or civil wars.1 The process of rebuilding has always
been influenced by the prevailing political and social conditions in the country.
The current attempt is not going to be an exception. The profound social transformation of Afghanistan during more than two decades of a devastating war has
drastically changed the traditional political and social landscape of Afghanistan.
The rebuilding of a national army will have to be intertwined with the creation of
a legitimate broad-based government, economic reconstruction, and the demobilization process.
This article looks at the challenges facing the creation of a new national
army in Afghanistan as well as the opportunities for responding to these challenges. It reviews the experience of the past as well as the recent war-instigated
social and political transformation to identify conceptual frameworks for building a national military establishment in Afghanistan.

Tribal Fighters and Government Soldiers
Few of Afghanistan’s armies have successfully monopolized the legitimate use of force. The Afghan army generally has not been the only military institution within a social system imbued with military pluralism. The country
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traditionally has relied on popular uprisings to fight foreign invasions and enlisted the aid of tribal levies to beef up the regular army to crush domestic rebellions. The situation reflects the evolving nature of state-society relations since
the emergence of Afghanistan as a modern state at the end of the 19th century. It
was then a loose conglomerate of tribes and ethnic communities over which the
central government had varying degrees of control at different times.
Until the middle of the 20th century, the central government in Afghanistan was not strong enough to integrate the nation through a wide network of political and economic institutions. Society remained segmented and unmobilized.
The lack of integration made the communities, particularly in tribal areas,
semi-independent, mostly relying on their own resources and their own traditional institutions. This included local military forces that were mobilized during
inter-tribal conflicts or foreign threats. The tribal militias also could be mustered
in support of or against the central government during domestic disturbances.
This nation-in-arms helped the country survive when the central government collapsed or the state army disintegrated in the face of foreign invasion.
These unique sociopolitical conditions favored the development of a national culture of guerrilla warfare.2 This was an indigenous form of guerrilla warfare, which in strategic terms was different from the one conceptualized by Mao
Zedong. The latter aims at seizing state power through organizing “liberated
zones,”3 while the Afghan model is defensive in nature and tactical in scope.
Khushal Khan Khattak, the renowned 17th-century Pashtun national leader and
thinker clearly detailed the guerrilla tactics of the Afghan highlanders:
When you fight a smaller enemy detachment you should decisively attack with surprise. But, if the enemy receives reinforcement [or] when you encounter a stronger
enemy force, avoid decisive engagement and swiftly withdraw only to hit back
where the enemy is vulnerable. By this you gain sustainability and the ability to
fight a long war of attrition. . . . A war of attrition eventually frustrates the enemy,
no matter how strong he may be . . . and that gives a chance of victory to a small
force fighting against an invading army.4

It was in such a setting that the tribal warrior felt at home. It was quite a challenge
to transform such a fighter into a soldier in a disciplined army ruled by a professional ethos and regulated by conventional military norms.

Ali Ahmad Jalali is Director of the Afghan Radio Network Project and Chief of the
Pashto Service of the Voice of America, in Washington, D.C. He is a former colonel in the
Afghan army and served as a top military planner with the Afghan resistance following the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He attended higher command and staff colleges in Afghanistan, the United States, Britain, and Russia, and has lectured widely. Mr. Jalali is the author
of several books, including a three-volume military history of Afghanistan. His most recent
book, The Other Side of the Mountain (1998), coauthored with Lester Grau, is an analytical
review of the mujahideen war with the Soviet forces in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.
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“This is the fourth time in 150 years of
Afghanistan’s turbulent history that the country
is recreating the state military following its
total disintegration caused by foreign
invasions or civil wars.”

The primacy of tribal and local loyalty among the soldiers impaired the
army’s commitment to the government cause. The army was often crudely organized and led, inadequately armed, poorly trained, meagerly paid, and badly fed.
Such an army was hardly capable of standing firm in the face of a determined foe.
However, the same soldiers would fight with utmost determination with their
kinsmen in their own space under the leadership of their local chiefs. A British
observer of the Afghan society, Edward Hensman, wrote in 1881: “The Afghan
does not lack native courage, and in hill warfare he is unrivaled, so long as it takes
the shape of guerrilla fighting. But once he is asked to sink his identity and to become merely a unit in a battalion, he loses all self-confidence and is apt to think
more of getting away than of stubbornly holding his ground as he would have
done with his own friends led by his own chief.”5
The government’s legitimacy stemmed from dynastic rights or was
based on military power. Both could be challenged by other contenders. This situation was detrimental to the army’s loyalty. Governments often invoked Islam
and potential threats by “infidel” foreign powers to motivate soldiers to serve the
Islamic ruler (padshah-e Islam) and his government.6 Although Islam united the
society in common cause and jihad against alien powers and ideology, it did not
politically weld the communities to create a religion-based ideal Islamic nation
or umma. As T. A. Heathcote notes, the system, “which ordered the life of most
people outside the city areas, was certainly as potent in political terms as the national state system of Europe in 1914. Men felt a fierce loyalty to their own tribe,
such that, if called upon they would without hesitation assemble in arms under
their own tribal chiefs and local clan leaders.”7
Recruitment for the regular army has always been difficult. Weak government control of the country and lack of resources hindered both compulsory
and voluntary enlistment. In 1895, the government introduced a partial draft system called hasht nafari, whereby one man in eight was called to serve in the army.
The recruitment quota was imposed on the population of a district or a tribal area.
Under this system, the recruits, selected by drawing names (peshk), had the option of paying for exemption or they could choose to pay for a substitute (ewaz).
The hasht nafari underwent several modifications after the turn of the 20th cen74
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tury, until it was replaced by a universal draft system in 1941. The draft was an
extremely unpopular system and was never fully implemented. Many people
even migrated to neighboring countries to escape the harsh enforcement of hasht
nafari.8 Public discontent intensified in the 1920s when King Amanullah tried to
firmly enforce the system. This move caused tribal unrest.9
In such a socio-political environment, the state armies were faced with
two major challenges: creating a national loyalty among the soldiers that would
surpass their tribal allegiance, and providing the military units with the skills to
fight effectively in both counterinsurgencies and conventional wars. The response to both challenges was slow and unsteady. The pace of progress was
linked to social and political development, expansion of government influence
through economic modernization, and the availability of resources to increase
the army’s professional effectiveness.

Evolution of National Armed Forces
In the mid-1860s, a deserting Afghan soldier justified his defection
from the army by telling the beleaguered Amir Sher Ali: “Your kingship is unstable, the service incentives are unattractive, and I am longing for home.”10 The
statement encapsulates the problems that Afghan governments have faced in
raising and maintaining a regular army in a tribal society.
Traditionally the Afghan governments relied on three military institutions: the regular army, tribal levies, and community militias. The regular army
was sustained by the state and commanded by government leaders. The tribal or
regional levies (irregular forces) had part-time soldiers provided by tribal or regional chieftains under pre-negotiated contracts. The chiefs received tax breaks,
land ownership, cash payment, or other privileges in return. The community militia included all available able-bodied members of the community, mobilized to
fight for common causes under community leaders. Each of these institutions
had certain strengths and weaknesses.
The combination of these military institutions created a formidable
force whose components supplemented each other’s strengths and minimized
their weaknesses. The regular army’s conventional military capacity was supplemented by the tribal levies’ skills in guerrilla warfare. The community militias
were able to secure the army’s lines of communication in their areas and provide
logistical support. On the other hand, disharmony or lack of cooperation among
these institutions caused the regular army enormous difficulties.
The evolution of Afghanistan as a unified nation has been influenced
by the interplay of the country’s different military institutions. Overreliance on
irregular forces cost the government control of the tribes, while maintaining
a strong military depleted the government’s limited resources, hindering the
nation-building process.
During the turbulent years of the early 19th century, the government
army in Afghanistan consisted of the followers of various tribal chiefs whose alAutumn 2002
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“Few of Afghanistan’s armies have successfully
monopolized the legitimate use of force.”

legiance to the Amir was unpredictable. Their shifting alliances with powerseekers kept the state politically unstable. Amir Sher Ali Khan (1863-78), is
credited with founding the modern national army in Afghanistan. He tried to curb
the influence of the tribal chiefs and their irregular forces by creating a modern
army.11 He introduced a modern system of recruitment based on voluntary military service, as well as an ethnic balance of military units and the integration of
some irregular troops into the state army.12
At the outbreak of the second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80), the regular
army was about 50,000 strong and consisted of 62 infantry and 16 cavalry regiments, with 324 guns mostly organized in horse and mountain artillery batteries.13 However, much of the organization existed only on paper. Poor training,
lack of unit discipline, lack of unit cohesiveness, and inadequate officer education made the army a paper tiger. The army lost cohesiveness after initial clashes
with invading British forces in 1878 and ceased to exist as an organized force after its defeat in Charasia, near Kabul. Yet elements of the fragmented army joined
the tribesmen and civilian militia to put up a firm resistance against the British
forces, forcing them out in 1880.
Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880-1901), who succeeded to the throne
after the second Anglo-Afghan War, had to recreate the army from scratch. He
faced the enormous challenges of reunifying the country, strengthening internal
security, and subduing semi-independent chieftains. His main instrument in responding to these challenges was a powerful army subsidized by the British. Instead of the leader’s traditional reliance on military contingents provided by tribal
chiefs or the feudal levy system, the Amir tried to create an army totally linked to
the state.14 However, the enormity of the task far outstripped the government’s
military capacity. The Amir was forced to rely on tribal militia that numbered up
to 40,000 during the pacification of Hazarajat (1891-93).15 The Amir’s heavyhanded policy took its toll in later years when the simmering political discontent
expressed itself violently on several occasions during the politically-relaxed reign
(1901-19) of Amir Habibullah.
King Amanullah (1919-29) established the legitimacy of his reign by
waging a successful anti-British war to regain full independence. However, he
lost support among the tribes due to his drastic modernization reforms.
Amanullah’s push for rapid modernization was not matched by efforts to build an
effective military force to back his reforms. Counting on the nation’s martial
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qualities to deter foreign threats, the reformist monarch did not see a compelling
need for a large army.16 His neglect had a disastrous impact. Most of the modernization plans were not implemented, the size of the military was ruthlessly cut,
and troops were poorly trained and ineffectively led. The army soon shrank to
23,000 and eventually to 11,000 because of recruitment problems. His lastminute effort in 1928 failed to reverse the decline, and consequently the Afghan
army failed to quell the 1928-29 rebellion that cost Amanullah his throne and
plunged the country into civil war.
The modernization of the Afghan army that began in the first quarter of
the 20th century was a slow and incremental process. The national army became
more attached to the government and acquired a solid institutional identity as the
country underwent a process of integration through a nationwide education system, economic progress, and political development.
Nadir Shah (1929-33) oversaw the reconstruction and improvement of
the army as a key element in responding to security challenges and supporting a
measured modernization process. By 1933, the army numbered some 70,000.
The Afghan military college was reopened in 1930, and training was modeled on
the old Turkish army. The development of a national recruitment system and the
professional education of officers and NCOs were among the major achievements of the Afghan military in the first half of the 20th century. The introduction
of modern weapons into the army—particularly combat aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, and automatic weapons—brought a landmark shift in the correlation of forces between the center and the tribal areas. The superior firepower of
the state army served to prevent domestic security challenges.17
In the mid-20th century, foreign policy exigencies and domestic needs
to back rapid modernization of the society spurred a major reorganization of
the armed forces. The partitioning of India in 1947 touched off an irredentist
Afghan campaign demanding the creation of an independent Afghan-linked
“Pashtunistan” in Pakistan’s Pashtun areas. These areas were part of Afghanistan
before they were annexed by the British in the 19th century. The country also
needed a modern army to support economic development and social reforms, including education and women’s issues. As the United States turned down Afghan
demands for military assistance, Kabul turned to the Soviet Union for military
and economic aid.
Soviet assistance enabled Afghanistan to improve the structure, armament, training, and command and control system of its armed forces. The
strength of the military in the 1960s reached 98,000, with 90,000 in the army and
8,000 in the air force.18

Politicization and Disintegration of the Army
Despite the steady progress in modernizing and training the army and the
development of the air force under King Zaher Shah (1933-73), the Afghan military establishment failed to reach the level of professional maturity necessary to
Autumn 2002
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resist politicization. Political naivete of the peasant-based officer corps allowed a
handful of politically motivated mid- and low-level officers to stage two military
coups in the 1970s that eventually brought the communists to power in 1978.
Armed resistance to the “Saur Revolution” plunged the country into a devastating
civil war leading to the Soviet military intervention (1979-89) and increased Western support of the Islamic-led anti-regime resistance forces, the mujahideen.
Simultaneous, rapid, and large-scale arming of opposing forces brought
a major portion of the population under arms in the 1980s.19 The trend continued
during the post-communist civil war (1992-2001), as neighboring countries and
other international actors armed rival Afghan factions. The process gradually
de-professionalized the armed forces and gave power to a variety of ethnic and regional factions, self-serving warlords, and criminal freebooters.20
The fall of the Moscow-backed communist regime in Kabul in 1992
disintegrated the state as well as the army. Bits and pieces of the fragmented military either disappeared or joined the warring factions that were locked in a
drawn-out power struggle. The warring factions were composed of odd assortments of armed groups with varying levels of loyalties, political commitment,
professional skills, and organizational integrity. Many of them felt free to switch
sides, shift loyalties, and join or leave the larger group spontaneously. They possessed neither the strength of the anti-Soviet jihad warriors nor the discipline of
regular forces. They were haunted by the weaknesses of both.
In 2001-02, exploiting the sudden fall of the Taliban to the US-led coalition air strikes, the Northern Alliance, the only organized anti-Taliban military
faction in Afghanistan, moved swiftly to fill the vacuum. The absence of a credible political alternative to the Taliban blocked the emergence of an ethnically
balanced post-Taliban government. The anti-Taliban Pashtun forces that took
over in most of the southern provinces were too scattered to offer a counterbalancing bloc vis-à-vis the Northern Alliance.
Taking advantage of an unexpected opportunity, the noncommitted warlords were attracted by Western cash outlays and joined the fray for easy victories.
Their militias expanded overnight. On paper the country now (in early summer
2002) has over 40 divisions and dozens of separate brigades. Many of the divisions
78
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are led by Panjshiri commanders.21 Many others are commanded by leaders closely
connected with the Panjshiri faction. Out of the current eight “army corps,” the
Northern Alliance controls six.22 Further, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Deputy Minister of Defense, maintains his own seven-division army in the north.23
Several divisions are under central command.24 Most of these units are composed
of armed groups affiliated with warlords and their allies who jumped onto the
anti-Taliban bandwagon as the radical militia crumbled under the weight of the coalition bombing campaign. The armed groups that occupied the military posts and
localities deserted by the Taliban and their foreign supporters gained the status of
military units from the Northern Alliance leaders who simply wanted to expand
their allies. Now the Afghan Ministry of Defense provides funds to finance this extraordinary military inflation.25

Back to the Future
As Afghanistan begins to emerge from a long period of devastating conflict, the country sifts through the rubble of social and political destruction to try to
piece together a peaceful future. Security is the essential prerequisite for the effort.
It involves reconstruction of a national army and disbanding the factional militias
and private armies. Rebuilding the Afghan armed forces cannot be done in a vacuum. Unless the issues that divided the country are addressed through the emergence of a legitimate, broad-based, effective, and internationally backed
government, it will be hard to build a nationally oriented and professionally skilled
army. The major challenge is to create a military loyal to the state.
Currently the country is politically and militarily fragmented. Ethnic
warlords with questionable track records claim to represent different ethnic
groups and geographic regions in the country. Despite their nominal support of
the interim administration in Kabul, provincial strongmen and warlords maintain
their private armies, sources of income, foreign linkages, and autonomous administrations. Even the Northern Alliance militia that controls Kabul is a partisan army with factional loyalties. Any solution that perpetuates the leadership of
these warlords will be detrimental to long-term peace and stability. This will also
hinder the development of national harmony that has suffered heavy blows during the long civil war in Afghanistan.
The first step toward building a national army in Afghanistan is broadening the base of the government, which will promote political stability, public trust,
and security in the country. Such a government will be able to direct the re-creation
of a nationally oriented, ethnically balanced, morally disciplined, professionally
skilled, and operationally coherent Afghan army and force the local militias to disarm and disband. An army perceived as a means of furthering the ambitions of a
single political or ethnic group, on the other hand, would not lead to an effective
demobilization effort. Another condition needed for the emergence of a reliable
military establishment is reconstruction of the Afghan economy, offering alternative employment for former combatants not integrated into the new army.
Autumn 2002
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Ethnic Balance
Given the ethnic politicization and polarization of the country, the new
Afghan army has to be multi-ethnic at all levels. The pre-war Afghan army was an
ethnically balanced force. Indeed, Afghanistan has a long history of providing for
ethnic balance in the military establishment. The alternative—creating ethnically
homogeneous military units—has proved in the past to be problematic. While soldiers of homogeneous units understood each other and easily worked together,
their loyalty could not be trusted when the military moved against their home turf.
In such cases the government usually disarmed units affiliated with the revolting
area or tribe.26
The draft system in place after 1941 ensured ethnic diversity in army
formations. Recruits from different ethnic and geographic communities were integrated into professional military outfits. The army was both a security force
and a national educational institute where Afghan youth also received literacy
and civic education. In fact, the army was the most significant integrating institution in the multi-ethnic Afghan society. The officer corps before 1963 was not
all-inclusive, however, and was dominated by Pashtuns and Tajiks. But with the
beginning of the democratic period in 1963, cadets for officer and NCO training
schools were selected from all provinces and all ethnic communities under a
quota system proportional to the population. The officer corps thus was ethnically diverse beginning in the late 1960s.
The draft system is not likely to work under current conditions, however, for political, professional, and economic reasons. First, the nascent postwar
central government is not powerful enough to enforce a draft system. Second, an
army of conscripts who serve for only a short time can hardly acquire the skills,
experience, and cohesiveness needed to respond to the enormous security challenges of the current situation. Third, the economic hardship faced by the nation
dissuades people from acquiescing to induction into a poorly paid draft army.
Most of the young people are supporting their families and have to earn money.
While the Afghan government envisages an ethnically balanced army,
there is a lot of suspicion that the Tajiks who now control the military are influencing the ethnic mix of the newly formed ANA battalions. There are reports that in
newly formed units the Tajiks outnumber other ethnicities, including the Pashtuns,
the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan.27 Persistence of such suspicions can undermine the demobilization of factional militias and will need to be addressed.
The greatest challenge facing the new army, however, is to integrate the
multi-ethnic military units into unified professional outfits. This professional cohesion can be achieved through a “chemical” integration of the soldiers rather than
their “physical” combination—“the bonding together of members of an organization/unit in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their
unit, and the mission.”28 Only with such cohesiveness will the soldiers’ professional loyalty surpass their ethnic, political, and regional allegiance. This can oc80
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“The first step toward building a national army
in Afghanistan is broadening the base of the
government, which will promote political stability,
public trust, and security in the country.”

cur only after a long period of joint training and experience when members of a
unit deal with common challenges, fight together, suffer together, work together,
and live together. The longer the association, the tighter the bonding. But it takes a
healthy political and service environment, systematic training, and effective leadership to achieve such unit cohesion. A 1995 attempt to integrate factional fighters
into professional military units failed because of political instability.29

Structure of the Military Establishment
The size, structure, and professional training of the army will depend on
the nature of potential threats, the mission, the area of operations, and available
resources. The immediate threats are expected to be domestic and concern internal security. Security threats may stem from anti-government armed challenges
by political and religious militants, foreign-inspired rebellions, and infighting
between local warlords. Further, Afghanistan is located in an important strategic
area and has to face potential threats emerging from a volatile and dangerous
neighborhood. Interstate conflicts coupled with religious militancy, organized
crime, and smuggling constitute potential threats to the whole region.
Given the geopolitical situation and available defensive capacity, it is
unrealistic to expect the ANA to respond to potential foreign threats. In the foreseeable future, Afghanistan will have to depend on international security arrangements and backing to deal with such external threats. The country has long
suffered from outside interference and is still vulnerable to foreign instigation
and support of renegade factions and militant forces. Afghanistan will need international protection against such foreign intervention. Afghanistan as a nation has
a great potential for mobilizing its people to fight foreign invasions, but experience also suggests that the nationwide defensive capacity needs to be harnessed
to support the continuity of the unified state in the current postwar period. With
international support, Afghanistan has the potential to build a mobile, professionally effective regular military force that can then serve as a deterrent against
direct foreign military threats.
The mission of the new Afghan army should be clearly defined in the
context of the country’s new military doctrine.30 In the past, the lack of clarity in
Autumn 2002
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defining the army’s role caused a great deal of organizational and operational
confusion. This ambiguity hampered the unit structure, equipment, and training
of the army. As a result the army was neither an effective internal security force
nor a reliable body for large-scale conventional warfare. Given the prevailing
geopolitical setting and political environment in and around Afghanistan, the
ANA is expected to provide military backing for the central government, which
will entail offsetting the factional militias, disarming illegal armed groups, and
backing up law enforcement agencies and other security forces in the country.
Given the nature of the threat, the army’s mission, and the extent of the
possible area of operations across the country, Afghanistan needs a military force
capable of rapid deployment to any part of the country. This requires an army
with high maneuverability and effectiveness. Such an army needs to be composed of three elements: garrison troops, mobile contingents, and a central rapid
deployment force. The garrison troops manning the regional bases of operation
will facilitate local stability, maintain the lines of communication, and provide
logistical support. The mobile troops—with airlift capability—will respond to
security threats in their zone of deployment. The central rapid deployment force
will serve as the central reserve, responding to crises in any military zone.
The size of the new Afghan army also depends on available resources.
The international community has made generous commitments to fund the reconstruction of Afghanistan. However, few countries have pledged funds for building
and training the national Afghan army and security forces. Since security is essential for restoring political stability and the reconstruction of the Afghan economy,
the creation of the national army should be a top priority in allocating available
funds. Afghanistan intends to build a 60,000-strong army, an 8,000-man air force,
a 12,000-man border guard, and a 70,000-member police force.31 The cost of organizing, training, arming, and maintaining such a large force is phenomenal by
Afghan standards. Insufficient funding will be devastating to the plan.
The cost effectiveness of the army is closely linked to the level of professional training of the military units. US Special Forces are conducting training
courses for several 600-strong battalions over an 18-month period that began in
May 2002. Each course lasts for ten weeks. The Green Berets are expected to
train 9,600 soldiers for the regular army and 3,000 for the border forces before
the Afghan instructors take over the training. Obviously this basic training is the
first step. It will have to be followed up by long periods of subsequent instruction,
specialized combat and combat support training, small and large unit maneuvers,
and command and staff exercises.
To develop effective military cohesion, leadership—particularly at the
small unit level—is of vital importance. This further signifies the need for a
highly trained and professionally effective officer and NCO corps, which is currently conspicuously absent in Afghanistan. The former trained officers are getting old, and the young officers lack adequate professional training. Many are
former guerrilla fighters with no education. Many are illiterate. It will take at
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“The greatest challenge facing the new army,
however, is to integrate the multi-ethnic military
units into unified professional outfits.”

least ten years for Afghanistan to build a qualified officer corps, one which can
help restore the military culture and replicate the units trained by the international community.

Command and Control
As an instrument of politics, the Afghan armed forces should be subordinated to popular civilian control. This is going to be a major challenge in Afghanistan, where armed groups and militias have long been involved in politics. Also,
the new Afghan army will be engaged mostly in conducting internal security missions. While external threats normally produce stable civil-military relations, involvement of the army in dealing with internal threats is conducive to unstable
civil-military relations. The latter can be avoided by achieving and securing the
participation of the people in politics, and blocking the dominance of special interest groups. Creating a national security council at the highest level of government
and a civil-military council at the ministry of defense level might prove beneficial.
The operational command and control of the army should be assigned to a
joint armed forces chief of staff (JAFCS), who will control not only the army and the
air force but also the border guards. Six military zone (corps) commands need to be
created to command and control the regional forces.32 These forces will include garrison troops, line of communication units, road construction units, and army aviation formations (transport aircraft and combat helicopters). Other elements will
include heavy artillery units, logistics formations, and military education institutions. Depending on the level of threat, a number of mobile brigades could be attached to the zone commands. The newly formed battalions are to be grouped in
combined-arms brigades, the main operational formation in the army under regional
corps. The central rapid deployment force, with both army and air force components, will have to be placed under a separate command under the JAFCS.33
Traditionally a large portion of the Afghan army was deployed along
the “Durand line.” This area, covering the Pashtun belt straddling the AfghanPakistan border, faced potential British military action in the 19th and early 20th
centuries and was considered the front line during the “Pashtunistan” dispute with
Pakistan in the second half of the 20th century. It is still the most unstable area in
the region. The current distribution of military forces is not in conformity with
strategic exigencies but is the outcome of the factional war. The bulk of the forces
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are now concentrated in the north and the west and less in the east and the south.34 A
redeployment and reorganization of the corps will be needed.

Demobilization and Reintegration
The demobilization of the civil war combatants and their reintegration
into the society is one of the greatest challenges facing postwar Afghanistan. According to Afghan government sources, there are over 200,000 irregular militia
combatants and war veterans dispersed throughout the country. They include three
types of armed groups: the “formal” factional militias that were involved in the
civil war, the “bandwagoners” who seized the opportunity to join the winning side
in the anti-Taliban war, and the freebooters who filled the vacuum created by the
sudden demise of the Taliban. The first group of armed men is closely attached to
the warring factions and loyal to the regional leaders. They are expected to survive
longer than the others. The last two groups of fighters are mostly incorporated by
local warlords.
Some local commanders have shown interest in downsizing their militias
because they cannot pay them. But other local warlords, who have access to drug
money and other resources, continue to expand their forces or draw freebooters to
their ranks.35 In recent months limited disarmament attempts have been made in
Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, and Smangan. Most of the disarmament
has affected the freebooters who are not affiliated with local warlords. There are
also reports that powerful local commanders are disarming their adversaries as a
means to increase their influence.36
Random disarmament efforts, however, are not an effective approach.
Unless a systematic demobilization program is put in place, the unemployed combatants will return to violence and banditry or join the holdouts of militant groups
and terrorists. Creating opportunities for peaceful employment would encourage
militia members to leave the warlords and thus help the national demobilization
process. The United Nations favors an inverse model of the traditional sequence of
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, suggesting instead a program of
reintegration and demobilization that would provide alternative employment for
the former combatants before they are actually disarmed. This requires funds for
launching quick-impact and labor-intensive projects to absorb former combatants.
With the restoration of the public work force (Qowaye Kar), agricultural assistance force (Qowaye Sabz) and creation of a demining army and a drug control
force, tens of thousands of former militia members could be reintegrated and demobilized. The pace of demobilization also will depend on the process of building
the new army and police force, the scope and speed of economic reconstruction,
and the restoration of the education system and government bureaucracy.
The demobilization process will need to be supervised by a national
commission of demobilization and reintegration. Until the national army becomes operationally effective, parts of the regional militias will have to be maintained as local security forces under strict control of the central government.
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They should be registered, trained, and reeducated in a professional ethos. Qualified combatants could be recruited for the national army and the police force.
The militias’ heavy weapons are to be collected by the national commission and
stored in secure depots.
The implementation of such an ambitious plan requires significant international support and cooperation from neighboring countries. This is an extremely challenging project. But there are no easy, inexpensive solutions to the
process of demobilizing hundreds of thousands of combatants and armed men
who know little more than fighting.

Conclusion
Rebuilding Afghanistan’s national army is not only an essential element in stabilizing the war-torn country but also a contribution to the effectiveness of the US-led international war on terrorism in South and Central Asia. It is a
highly cost-effective project, but also an expensive and lengthy endeavor. Its
success is linked to three major variables: the emergence of a legitimate
broad-based government, the availability of resources, and time. A legitimate
government will encourage the regional forces to dissolve their militias in the interest of creating a national army. Resources for the economic reconstruction of
Afghanistan will provide favorable conditions for demobilization and reintegration of the combatants, and for building an effective military establishment. And,
finally, the process will take time to reach fruition. Serious and continued US engagement, perseverance, and support is essential to build an effective national
army in Afghanistan, one that will hold a monopoly on the legitimate use of force
in support of empowering the central government and stabilizing the country.
NOTES
1. In the 1870s Amir Sher Ali Khan recreated the Afghan army that disintegrated during the second
Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80). In the 1880s Amir Abdur Rahman had to reestablish the army to unify the fragmented country. The army was remodeled under King Amanullah following the third Anglo-Afghan War
(1919), but it met a fatal blow during the civil war of 1929. A new military establishment was created by
Nadeshah after his accession in 1929. The Soviet-sponsored reorganization and modernization of the Afghan
army began in the 1960s and continued through the Moscow-backed communist rule. It was totally disintegrated during the civil war of 1992-2001.
2. The British forces faced major challenges in responding to this mode of warfare in the tribal areas of the
northwest frontier. See General Sir Andrew Skeen, Passing it On, Short Talks on Tribal Fighting on the Northwest Frontier of India (Aldershot and London: Gale and Polden, 1932), pp. 2-12.
3. See Peter Paret et al., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), p. 841.
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(Kabul: 1967), p. 56.
5. See Edward Hensman, The Second Afghan War (London: 1881), p. 329.
6. Each soldier of the regular army under Sher Ali was issued a copy of the Koran. The soldiers were required to study the Holy Scripture with the company’s mullah, who led them in religious rituals during off-duty
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8. Gankovsky, p. 65.
9. Rhea Talley Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan 1914-1929 (New York: Doubleday, 1973), p. 210.
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10. My conversation in Kabul in 1962 with an Afghan veteran who was quoting an eyewitness of the event
in the 1860s in Kabul when Amir Sher Ali was supervising the payment of government soldiers before moving
against his rivals.
11. It was probably the first time the Afghan army was being regularly trained, with the help of field manuals translated from English into Pashto and Dari. See Gankovsky, pp. 44-45.
12. Turkistanskii Vedomostii (“Turkistan Official Bulletin”) 1877, No. 25, in Gankovsky, p. 37.
13. The army had received 29,000 muzzle-loading and 5,000 breach-loading (Snider) rifles from the British government. The army also had 30,000 other firearms, mostly muzzle-loading muskets, smooth-bore and rifled. See The Second Afghan War 1878-80, Official Account, pp. 14-15, and Appendix 1, pp. 633-35.
14. At the death of the Amir the regular army consisted of 80 infantry battalions, 40 cavalry regiments, 100
artillery batteries, and 4,000 household troops. The overall strength of the army was 90,000.
15. Hasan Kakar, Afghanistan, A Study in Internal Political Development 1880-1896 (Kabul: 1971),
pp. 165-66.
16. In July 1923 Amanullah told the people, “These are the days of the pen, not of the sword . . . therefore
send your sons to school. Our martial qualities are sufficient, it is education that we lack.” Stewart, p. 209.
17. This, coupled with a state-funded education system and economic development programs, helped national integration and expansion of central government control. The situation enabled the army to successfully
respond to simultaneous internal disturbances, including the Katawz rebellion in 1937-39, the Shinwari revolt
of 1938, Alizai-Durani unrest in 1939, and the 1944-45 rebellion of the Safi tribe in eastern Kunar province.
18. The armed forces also included a 21,000-strong gendarmerie organized in battalions and regiments
and a 25,000-strong Public Works Force organized in companies, battalions, and construction units.
19. The United States sent $5 billion worth of weapons to the mujahideen during 1986-90, while the Soviet Union provided an estimated $5.7 billion (US) worth of weapons to Kabul during the same period. See
Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1995), p. 179.
20. In 1990-91 the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan increasingly relied on militia units or paramilitary forces. The regime was finally overthrown by the defection of the major militia formation to the
mujahideen. See M. N. Azimi, Ordu wa Siasat dar Seh Daha-ye Akhir (“Army and Politics in the Last Three Decades”), (Peshawar: 1998), pp. 400, 417-23, 491, 512-32.
21. Ahmad Rashid, “Security Concerns Mount in Afghanistan As country Enters Critical Reconstruction
Phase,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 19 March 2002.
22. The Central Corps (four divisions, all in Kabul), 1st Corps in Nangrahar (two divisions), 2d Corps in
Kandahar (three divisions), 3d Corps in Paktia (three divisions), 4th Corps in Herat (three divisions and several new
units made up of former mujahideen), 5th Corps in Charikar (three divisions), 6th Corps in Baghlan-Takhar (three
divisions), 7th Corps in Mazar-e Sharif (four divisions). The total strength on paper is estimated at 700,000, while
the actual strength is around 200,000. My interviews with several Afghan military officers in Kabul, March 2002.
23. The divisions are deployed in Mazar-e Sharif, Jawzjan, Sar-e Pul, Hairatan, and Mamaymaneh.
24. These divisions are 1st and 31st in Kabul, 34th in Bamian, 36th in Logar, 41st in Ghor, 42d in Wardak,
71st in Farah, 100th in Laghman, and 27th in Qalat. Twenty-seven Border Guard brigades are being formed.
25. Author’s conversation with several Afghan officials, including Defense Minister Qasim Fahim,
Kabul, June 2002.
26. For example, in 1912 during a rebellion in Paktia, the Amir ordered the Mangal and Zadran regiments
in Kabul and Jalalabad to be disarmed. Similarly, in 1938 the disturbances in the eastern district of Shinwar
prompted the government to disarm Shinwari troops based in Jalalabad.
27. David Rohde, “Training an Afghan Army that Can Shoot Straight,” The New York Times, 6 June 2002.
28. Darryl Henderson, Cohesion, The Human Element in Combat (Washington: NDU Press, 1985), p. 4.
29. Recruits from five main political parties could stay together for only seven months before they deserted the government “army” in response to the instructions from the leaders of their quarreling parties.
30. Afghanistan has never had an official military doctrine defining the country’s defense policy and directing the creation of a strategic-technological infrastructure to support its implementation.
31. Michael Christie, “Afghanistan’s New National Army Slowly Takes Shape,” Reuters, Kabul, 2 June 2002.
32. These zones could be the central, eastern and southeastern, southwestern, western, northern, and
northeastern zones.
33. The combined-arms brigade will consist of three light infantry battalions, a tank battalion, an artillery
regiment, a reconnaissance company, a technical unit, an engineer company, a signal company, an air defense
battery, and a logistical support unit.
34. Five corps are in the north and the west, and three corps are in the south and east.
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